Abstract: Th e adoption of the new presidential election system in Turkey has strengthened the democratic legitimacy of the head of state, by virtue of the presidency now being determined by popular vote. Th e new law, however, has many democratic defi cits. Moreover, the circumstances of its adoption as well as coupling it with the introduction of a particular type of presidential system, tends to indicate that the intentions of the AKP leaders have less to do with the willingness to democratize the country than with political interests. Paradoxically, as a result, a theoretically more democratic presidential election law can open the door for the enhancement of authoritarian tendencies in the Turkish state. One consequence of introducing the presidential system to strengthen the president's offi ce by way of popular vote, is that it can create too strong an executive power which is not suffi ciently balanced by other institutions forming the Turkish political system -both nationally and at regional/local level.
Introduction
In the Republic of Turkey, aft er the Second World War, the choice of the country's president was made by the members of the Turkish parliament -the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, in accordance with the Constitutions of 1924 Constitutions of , 1961 Constitutions of and 1982 . Such a method of selecting the head of state was compatible with the country's parliamentary political system. General elections took place only in the case of Kenan Evren; this was the outcome of a particular situation which had arisen aft er a coup in 1980. Subsequent Presidents of Turkey were once again appointed by the Parliament 1 .
. Th e aim of this article is to answer the question whether the adoption of the new electoral law, including the introduction of direct presidential elections, will aid the democratization process in the country or, on the contrary, will be conducive to the development of authoritarian tendencies which have been (again) noticeable in Turkey over the last few years. Th e author will test the hypothesis that the new legislation, despite strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the head of state, will be a "critical juncture", potentially leading to Turkish issues with democracy being exacerbated. Th is will be determined by the political conditions at the time the new law was adopted and is being enacted, as well as issues with the political system that exist in Turkey, which do not provide checks and balances to the strengthened position of the head of state as an executive body. Th e fi rst part of this article will outline the presidential elections procedurebefore the changes and aft er the changes have been introduced. Th is will be followed by the analysis of factors -formal and political -critical to providing an answer to the issue of the signifi cance of the new legal provisions of presidential elections for democratisation. Th is will require analysis of the contents of legal acts, to indicate functional and dysfunctional elements for the democratic character of the political system, as well as utilising aspects of the analysis of the decision making -that is considering the factors behind the decision to change electoral law and the choice of how to interpret the results of these changes.
Th e outline of electoral procedures in Turkish presidential elections
Th e Turkish Constitution of 1982 has a simplifi ed procedure for electing the President as compared to the Constitution of 1961. Under the provisions of Art. 101-102 of the 1982 fundamental act, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey had been, until recently, electing a president for the period of seven years, from among parliamentarians and Turkish citizens with passive electoral rights. All of those had to have a degree and be over 40 years of age.
Fielding a candidate from outside the Parliament was possible with a written application from at least one fi ft h of all the MPs. Th e period between presenting the presidium of the Assembly with the list of candidates and the end of the elections was 30 days. In order to be elected, the presidential candidate had to win two thirds of the vote of the total number of MPs in a secret ballot. If, in the course of the two rounds of the elections, which were held at least two days apart, no-one got the required majority, the third round was held, decided by the absolute majority of votes of the total number of MPs. If the outcome was undecided even in the third round, there was a fourth round, with the two candidates from the third round with the best results. If it proved impossible to choose a President from between the two candidates with the absolute majority of votes, the Parliament was dissolved and fresh elections were held. Th e possibility of such outcome forced MPs to seek compromise.
Nobody could hold the offi ce twice. Th e President was required to be neutral, which meant that, as well as resigning his parliamentary seat (if held), the president had to sever links with his own party. Th e President was sworn into the offi ce in front of the National Assembly (Art. 103 of the Constitution). In case of an illness or if the President left the country, or if the offi ce became vacant due to death, resignation or any other reason, he was replaced by the chair of the Assembly until the new head of state was elected (Art. 106 of the Constitution) 6 .
6 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, Kanun No. 2709 , Kabul Tarihi 7.11.1982 (Resmi Gazete, 9 Kasım 1982 . Th e President is still elected from among parliamentarians over 40 who hold a degree, or from among Turkish citizens who meet the above criteria and who have passive electoral rights to the Parliament. Th e main diff erence is that the President is now elected by the nation, not the MPs. Th erefore the provisions of the law on elections and voter registers started to apply. Active electoral rights in presidential elections are held by Turkish citizens over 18 years of age. Th is does not apply, however, as with Parliamentary elections, to serving soldiers and junior offi cers, students of military academies and those convicted by a court and serving a custodial sentence with the exception of those convicted of an unintentional off ence (in which case voting takes place in a penal institution under the supervision of a qualifi ed judge). Voting is mandatory (which, as with other elections is not always enforced in practice).
In May 2012, therefore, aft er the Parliamentary elections of 2011, the provisions of the above 1961 Act were amended in order to make it easier for Turkish citizens living abroad to vote. On the basis of the amended legislation a special register is created, with the names of persons registered in Turkish consulates and embassies. Th is register is separate from the central national electoral register, linked to the general, internet-based, register of residents serviced by the Turkish Home Offi ce. Electoral commissions, consisting of fi ve representatives of political parties and civil servants, are established in around 100 polling stations abroad. Aft er the vote the ballot boxes are sent over to Turkey. Votes are counted together with national votes at a district level (Tur. ilçe). Elections abroad were held between 31 July 2014 and 3 August 2014. Th eir disadvantage was the underdeveloped system of information regarding registration (many people did not register and ultimately did not vote), which was reported by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) before the elections Th e presidential term was reduced from seven to fi ve years and lasts until the new head of state takes the offi ce. Th e same person may be elected to offi ce again (it is possible to hold the offi ce of the President of Turkey twice). Presidential candidatures, both from the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and from outside, need to be submitted in writing by at least 20 MPs. Political parties which have won more than 10% of the votes in parliamentary elections prior to presidential elections may submit a joint candidate.
Elections have to be held within 60 days of the end of term. Th e same number of days is applicable if the offi ce becomes vacant for any reason other than the end of term. Th e elections are run and controlled, just like parliamentary elections, by the Supreme Electoral Council (consisting of seven members and four deputies elected by the judiciary for four years), county and district councils (elected for two years, the fi rst ones consist of judges, the latter -persons appointed by political parties and civil servants apart from the chair -an experienced judge) and electoral commissions established for the duration of elections. Political parties may have their representatives in the top level electoral bodies, including the Supreme Electoral Council; however, they do not have the right to vote.
Th e electoral campaign lasts from the point of fi nalising the list of candidates (11 July 2014 with the last presidential elections) until the last evening before the elections day. Th e general rules for conducting the campaign are no diff erent to presidential elections. In March 2014, an appropriate amendment of the law enabled running the campaign and having election materials in other languages than Turkish. A specifi c outcome with regards to presidential elections is refi ning the rules of fi nancing the campaign. Candidates must not receive resources from political parties, just from individual citizens who set up a special bank account for this purpose. Loans are not permitted. Candidates are obliged to submit reports to the Supreme Electoral Council which controls the fi nancial side of the elections (within ten days of the elections results) concerning campaign expenses.
In order to be elected, a candidate is required to gain an absolute majority of valid votes (which was accomplished in 2014 by Erdoğan). If they fail to reach this majority, a second round of elections takes place on the second Sunday aft er the fi rst round. Th e second round is open to the two candidates with the largest number of votes. Th e winner is the candidate with the largest number of valid votes. Should one of the two candidates in the second round die, or be deprived of the passive electoral rights, their place is taken by the candidate with the second largest number of votes. What is of interest is that, in the second round, if there is only the one candidate, the vote takes the form of a referendum. Should the candidate receive the majority of valid votes, he becomes the President of Turkey.
Presidential candidates, other than the Prime Minister and ministers, must resign government posts. Just as before, the president elect must resign party membership to remain impartial. If they were elected from within the Parliament, they give up their parliamentary seat. Th ey are still sworn-in in front of the Turkish Parliament, under Article 103 of the Constitution. Th e provision for the president being replaced, if necessary, by the leader of the Parliament, under Art. 106 of the Constitution, remains unchanged.
Functional and dysfunctional elements of electoral law 9
Certain measures adopted as part of the law on presidential elections in Turkey would indicate that it could be conducive to democratisation of the state. Th e abovementioned legal acts facilitate the participation of Turkish citizens living abroad and therefore have strengthened the common and general nature of the elections of the head of state. As indicated before, the disadvantage was an underdeveloped system of information regarding registration for the elections which resulted in a relatively low participation in 2014 elections. However, the OSCE assessment indicated that the change is positive. Th is assessment also included detailed guidelines for fi nancing electoral campaigns, contained in the amended legislation, which re-inforced the principle of transparency. Th e OSCE also highlighted the fact that the campaign could be conducted in various languages and dialects, not just in Turkish, which again is signifi cant for democratisation. Th is was important for Kurdish candidates, and could have been a factor (although not the factor) in Selahattin Demirtaş, the candidate of Kurdish political groupings led by the People's Democratic Party (HDP, Halkların Demokratik Partisi), getting 9.76% of the votes 10 . However, the existing electoral law has many fl aws with regards to the democratic character of the whole procedure of electing the President of Turkey. Th is is with regards to both the act of electing the President as well as the general electoral rules which apply in the case of presidential elections. Th e OSCE points out a number of defi ciencies in this context. On one hand, the general nature of both passive and active electoral rights is limited. In the fi rst instance, there is a lifelong exclusion on standing in elections for prisoners and those who have not completed military service (which is an important duty, and exemptions, for example, due to belief, are diffi cult to obtain). Moreover, the requirement of the minimum of 10% of the vote for the parties who wish to register presidential nominees limits the number of candidates standing for elections as well as the possibility for independent candidacy. Th is was refl ected in the August 2014 elections where there were three presidential candidates. Ekmelledin İhsanoğlu theoretically stood as an independent candidate, but was supported to a greater or lesser degree by the two opposition parties -Th e Republican People's Party (CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) National Movement Party (MHP, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) and later by 11 other groupings. Th e higher education requirement raises some issues over the principle of non-discrimination. It is worth recalling that active electoral rights are limited in the case of prisoners (with exceptions) and the military. Th e new legislation is not a suffi cient guarantee that the electoral register will not contain names of those not eligible to vote. Th is is due to electoral lists oft en lacking accurate data. Moreover, electoral legislation acts do not suffi ciently provide for regulating and controlling the bodies organising and running the elections. In practice, this causes lack of transparency in the work of these bodies as well as threatening impartiality in assessing electoral complaints. Th e lack of an appeals procedure over the outcome of a complaint based on a decision of the Supreme Electoral Council is also a concern. It is far from certain whether the right of Turkish citizens to submit individual complaints to the Constitutional Tribunal over the abuse of the fundamental rights and freedoms by public authorities, under Article 148 of the Constitution (aft er exhausting other means), applies here.
Another failing is that electoral law in presidential elections does not suffi ciently provide for several issues concerning the elections campaign, signifi cant from the perspective of democratic principles. Th e Law on Presidential Elections lacks suffi cient detail, including on the role of political parties, which are the means of association for citizens, in the electoral process. Th is concerns various aspects, including media participation in the campaign. It remains undefi ned whether time on air should be allocated to individuals or to political parties. Th e absence of a clear defi nition of air time in presidential campaign led to abuses of the position in offi ce and the exertion of infl uence over the media by Erdoğan. As the result, the AKP leader appeared on TV news three times as oft en as İhsanoğlu
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. Th e same applied to the issue of fi nancing the campaign. Although this was to be done through private support from individual citizens, not from public resources, the lack of clear limitations of such support can in practice lead to signifi cant diff erences in the sums expended, depending on the means of the candidate. Th is was perceivable in the August 2014 elections where Erdoğan, then the Prime Minister, received much greater fi nancial backing than the other candidates, including, contrary to legislation, public resources. In terms of citizens' donation the AKP politician received over 24 million Turkish Lira, and İhsanoğlu -2.1 million Turkish Lira 12 . Political parties and independent candidates have the right to observe the course of the elections. However, there are no specifi c provisions for individual citizens and those from overseas playing the role of observers.
Th e issue of politicizing the electoral law
A negative phenomenon in Turkey is the fact that democratisation stops being the aim of the reforms and becomes the means to achieve other goals. Th e latter serve the political power struggle which results in greater and greater social and political polarisation, linked not only to defi ciencies in democracy but also to the lack of political stability in the country
13
. Th e politicisation of legal reforms is noticeable with the law on presidential elections in Turkey. In answering the question of how this law contributes to democratisation of the Turkish state, it is necessary to indicate what motivated the AKP politicians who accepted the new system of presidential elections, later accepted by society in a referendum.
In order to do that, it is necessary to examine the circumstances that led to the change. On the 27th of April 2007 the fi rst round of presidential elections took place in the Turkish Parliament, without a decisive outcome. Th e candidate of the ruling Justice and Development Party -then the foreign secretary Abdullah Gül failed to secure the required majority of two thirds of the votes; this was partly due to the opposition boycotting the elections (with a few exceptions). Gül seemed like a less controversial candidate than the Prime Minister Erdoğan. However, according to secular, Kemalist elites -namely the army -the large part of the judiciary and the civil service, as well as part of the intelligentsia and the media -the very likely presidential choice of a nominee of a party with Islamist roots would threaten the constitutional principle of secularism. Th e ruling party would have gained an institution whose task is to safeguard that principle. Moreover, the choice of the AKP candidate could have led to the secular elite losing not only the infl uence over executive power but also the judiciary. Th e president approves the nominations for the highest judiciary offi ces. Consequently, late on the evening of the 27 th of April 2007, the high command issued a statement which was interpreted as a warning to the government, in which the army professed its readiness to defend the secular order. Th is was met with a vociferous protest from the AKP. Th e opposition CHP applied to the Constitutional Tribunal to have the fi rst round of the elections declared invalid due to the lack of the required quorum of the two thirds of Members of Parliament. Th e Tribunal, under signifi cant political pressure, approved the application on 1st May 2007; a decision that the Prime Minister Erdoğan described as a "blow to democracy". In the re-run of the fi rst round of the elections 6 th May 2007 the required quorum was again not reached.
Gül withdrew his candidacy just aft er, which made it impossible for the Parliament to choose the president. Th e Grand National Assembly of Turkey agreed to early elections, which were to take place on 22 nd July 2007. Th e new parliament elected Gül for president on the 28 th August 2007, in the third round of the elections 14 . Before its dissolution, the Turkish Parliament passed amendments to the Constitution on 10th May 2007, introducing general elections of the President. Th is was mainly the initiative of the AKP, which wanted to open the door for the party's presidential candidate to be elected by the citizens and to avoid an early move by the opposition to obstruct this. Th e then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer vetoed the changes on 25th May 2007, offi cially due to concerns over the stability of the country as the result of having a strong president in opposition to the Prime Minister. Th e presidential veto was rejected on 31st May 2007. Th erefore Sezer, on 15 June 2007, decided to hold a referendum over the proposed amendments to the Constitution, which was held in October 2007 15 . It is clear that the AKP government, in striving for the introduction of general elections of the President, was not motivated by the desire to advance democratisation. At the time the pace of Turkish democratic reforms slackened noticeably. Th e Justice and Development Party did not have as the fi rst priority strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the president (although offi cially the change was ascribed to the democratisation process), but a political interest, linked to the desire to take over another important state offi ce. Th e very good results achieved by the AKP in the July 2007 elections would allow them to speculate that their candidate would enjoy the greatest support in the contest for the offi ce of the President of Turkey, and that this would allow it to avoid the impasse and political perturbations, which may have been repeated if the head of state had continued to be elected by Parliament.
Another issue which would indicate that AKP actions were motivated by other matters than democratisation has been the use of the new law on presidential elections, mainly the introduction of the general elections, to justify a wider political project which, if implemented, may intensify authoritarian tendencies in Turkey. Erdoğan and many other AKP politicians would welcome the introduction of a presidential system, which in practice may lead to over-strengthening of the executive power at the expense of the legislative arm and the judiciary.
Th ese plans did not appear at the time when AKP came to power. Th e presidential system was repeatedly debated in the media and during countless meetings and conferences before 2002. Reforms were even draft ed on this issue, e.g. . Th ere were many arguments for the introduction of a presidential system, quoted by Turkish politicians, academics or publicists in 1999-2007. Such a system was regarded by its supporters as a panacea for all the ills related to the faulty functioning of the parliamentary system in Turkey. Th ey argued that the introduction of a presidential system would stabilise the Turkish political system. First of all, this would mean a technocratic, expert-led government and a strong presidential administration, independent of party political pressure and therefore more capable of solving Turkish problems. Secondly, it would have ended party favouritism and the fragmentation of the party political system -parties would have to join forces and support one of the two presidential candidates. Th e introduction of a presidential system would, according to its supporters, also enable strengthening of the democratic character of the Turkish political system. A president would be elected by the will of the nation. Th erefore a presidential system would introduce the abovementioned elements; that is, a real division of powers, as well as guaranteeing a greater independence for the parliament in exercising its legislative and control functions. A strong president would be able to better protect the Republic and its principles, secularism or nationalism
17
. So the introduction of a presidential system was strictly linked to presidential general elections -as per the two arguments above in favour of such a system of government. Th is was also clearly Erdoğan's standpoint. Th erefore aft er the new electoral law had been introduced it was stressed that, along with introducing general presidential elections, it will be expedient to make full use of the existing prerogatives of the head of state (e.g. leading the sessions of the Council of Ministers) and, secondly, increase the president's competencies so that his position in the political system is compatible with the method of election and increased legitimacy. Th e second question is enabled by constitutional changes which mean the introduction of a presidential system in Turkey. Th e debate over this issue intensifi ed in 2014/2015 due to parliamentary elections in June 2015. Th eir results were signifi cant from the perspective of introducing constitutional changes (Erdoğan spoke of the need for a "new constitution") opening the doors for the introduction of a presidential system in Turkey
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. Although in theory the arguments cited above are still valid, the analysis of what Erdoğan and other AKP politicians say allow for an assertion that the conviction of the necessity for the state to function eff ectively, as enabled through a strong presidential administration, started to dominate the presidential system debate over the arguments on making progress in the democratisation of Turkey.
Moreover, the introduction of the new government system is indicated not only as a means for solving problems created by the parliamentary system, but also by mechanisms inherent in a democratic system. In this context it is imperative to link Erdoğan's stance on the issue of introducing a presidential system with his negative attitude towards some measures inherent in a democracy. Th e Turkish President criticizes fi rst and foremost the principle of the division of powers, which was supposed to be strengthened by direct presidential elections, as opposed to the president being elected within the Parliament. According to Erdoğan, this principle makes it impossible for state structures to function eff ectively and effi ciently. First and foremost, this limits the executive authority by implication in a lengthy decision making process with the involvement of multiple bodies (the Turkish President complains that he cannot himself decide who to cooperate with), excessive bureaucracy and legislative and control procedures (including those in which the courts play a key role) 19 . Hence the necessity to strengthen the competences of the executive at the expense of legislative and the judiciary authority.
Th e critics of the drive to introduce a presidential system maintain that this can lead to authoritarian or dictatorial rule by the President (a "sultanate") through decrees automatically voted through by a weak parliament 20 . Regardless of whether such a scenario comes to pass, the introduction of a presidential system "á la AKP", or perhaps better "á la Erdoğan", may mean in practice signifi cant weakening of the principle of the division of powers and the system of checks and balances with regards to executive authority 21 . Th is has been refl ected in the actions of the AKP government since 2010, more on which below.
In accordance with statements made by Erdoğan and some of the other AKP politicians, the comprehensive introduction of a presidential system (the fi rst step to which was changing the electoral law) does not necessarily mean a strengthening of the democratic system. Paradoxically, the more the democratic legitimacy of the head of state, the more the door is open for the Turkish political system to become increasingly authoritarian in character.
Systemic problems in the process of democratization
Th e above scenario is plausible due to the systemic conditions that exist in Turkey, that pose some of the fundamental issues in the process of democratisation.
In that country there are insuffi cient factors which could balance the strengthened position of the president. Firstly, strong executive power is not balanced by regional or local authorities. Turkey has a centralised state structure linked to a traditional strong state model
22
. Th is does not permit properly devolved local authorities. Th ere are local authorities elected through local or regional elections on diff erent levels but these are under the control of central administration. Moreover, prefects and governors nominated by the central government function alongside elected authorities on the district and county level. Only at the municipal level and in rural areas administrative bodies function independently as local authorities. Higher administrative units perform statutory duties independently only in certain domains
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. Secondly, the traditional model of a strong state and its elites is linked to authoritarian tendencies refl ected in Turkish political practice. Th ese are a longstanding problem in Turkish political culture (this is therefore not characteristic of the AKP government) 24 . Th ese tendencies lead towards the strengthening of the executive power at the expense of the legislative power and the judiciary and towards a certain model of a strong political leadership. In both cases the division of powers and the system of checks and balances are weakened.
Th e AKP is clearly aiming to consolidate power in its hands. It has taken over all the important state institutions. At the same time the actions of the government through its legislative initiatives that are later passed by the Parliament as amendments to legal provisions and which are then approved by the President 25 , lead in the direction of strengthening the police and the executive authority at the expense of the judiciary. Such is the case with the Minister of Justice. Th is occurs specifi cally with nominations to the highest judiciary offi ces in the country (e.g. the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors) in order to control the actions of judiciary bodies and exclude or limit the remit of the courts and the prosecution. Th e second aspect anticipates, for example, changes to the Internet Act, which would increase the powers of the Information and Communication Technologies Authority or amendments to the regulation on the National Security Agency, which limit the agents' responsibility before the courts 26 . Th ese type of actions by the Turkish Government began with constitutional changes in 2010 (which in many aspects had a democratic character) and continued in the following years in reform packages concerning the judiciary powers
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. It is clear, therefore, that the critical approach to the division of powers voiced by Erdoğan infl uences the AKP government actions.
Th is specifi c state model is accompanied by strong leadership. Th e AKP governments, as with the centre-right governments of the 1980s and at the start of the 1990s, are characterised by a specifi c decision making process. Both the Prime Minister and later President Turgut Özal and Erdoğan are strong, charismatic leaders who make decisions independently or aft er consulting with a small circle of advisors, ministers or party members 28 . Th ese narrow circles of state elites participating in the decision making process in both cases got smaller and smaller with the passage of time.
Th irdly, the principle of the rule of law in Turkey left a lot to be desired. As mentioned above, an important factor in balancing the strengthening of the position of the executive authority as the result of the introduction of general elections is the work of the courts, including their function of control. Th e AKP government is aiming for limiting the remit of judiciary bodies, including fi rst and foremost the Constitutional Tribunal, which once again exposes the dislike of the party politicians for the principle of the division of powers and the checks and balances. Th is is not just, as mentioned before, about increasing the remit of the executive authority in terms of nominations for the judiciary offi ces or even actions aimed at reducing the authority of these bodies in relation to certain institutions. Th ere is a noticeable tendency to 25 Exceptions existed during the Gül presidency. Moreover, the passing of certain legal acts was on condition of the document being amended. disregard court decisions and sentences and undermine the credibility of the judiciary bodies by AKP politicians. In the fi rst case this is evident, for example, through the continuation of large public infrastructure projects in spite of the court decision to suspend the works. In the second case, the credibility of the main judiciary bodies is undermined. Th e best example of this is the work of the Constitutional Tribunal, whose decisions are negated when they are detrimental to the ruling party. In such cases, the AKP indicates the political, not substantive, motives for the actions of this institution
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. Th is is a risky phenomenon because it aims to take Turkey back to the period from before 1961 (when the Constitutional Tribunal was introduced to the new fundamental act) and therefore depriving the political system of independent control over the compatibility of legal acts with the Constitution.
Conclusions
At the start of this article the author posed a question whether the adoption of the new electoral law, and in particular the introduction of the common and general elections of the president, will facilitate democratization of the Turkish state. Th e analysis confi rm the hypothesis that the current legislation, despite strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the head of state and removing some of the earlier defi ciencies in the context of democratisation, may form a critical juncture, in which this may lead to an increase in authoritarian tendencies in Turkey's political system. Th is situation is due to the circumstances in which the new system for electing the head of state was adopted and the association made by politicians linked to the Justice and Development Party between general elections for the President and the necessity of introducing a presidential system "á la AKP". Th ese issues indicate that the intention of this party is to further political interests rather that to aim for greater democratisation of the country. As the result, paradoxically, the more democratic system of presidential elections may open the doors to a less democratic political system. Th e introduction of a presidential system in Turkey (as a further result of strengthening the position of the President thanks to general elections) will mean in practice the executive power becoming too strong, without being suffi ciently balanced by other political institutions, within the framework of the legislative authority and the judiciary. A centralised model of a strong state, the attempts by Turkish politicians to excessively strengthen the executive authority, (which are a traditional element of the political dilemma in Turkish political culture), and the issues with respecting the rule of law, do not allow for suffi cient checks and balances for a centralised executive authority, such as those in the USA, that is, relatively strong [devolved] regional and 29 Erdoğan: Anayasa Mahkemesi kararına saygı duymuyorum, "Radikal" of the 4th April 2014, www.radikal.com.tr/ politika/erdogan_halkimiz_bize_guven_oyu_vermistir-1184843 (accessed on: 15.04.2014).
